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In the judgment in case C-575/18 P last week, the Court of Justice closed a hole in
the EU’s system of judicial protection: it ruled that judicial review of a Commission’s
claim of own resources under Regulation 1150/2000 could be obtained through
an action for damages for unjust enrichment based on analogous application of
Art. 268, 340 (2) TFEU. This case shines a light both on the deficiencies in the EU
system of legal remedies and on the approach of the Court of Justice in addressing
them.
Background
The dispute at issue between the Czech Republic and the Commission concerns the
budget of the European Union, specifically the collection of the EU’s own resources.
Under Regulation 1150/2000 the Member States collect and transfer to the Union
certain tariffs and a portion of Value Added Tax. If a Member State fails to do so,
the Commission addresses a letter to that Member State, demanding payment by a
certain date. Should the Member State refuse to pay, the Commission can initiate
infringement proceedings. Meanwhile, the demanded amount accrues interests
(Art. 11 of Regulation 1150/2000: the respective central bank’s interest rate plus
2 percentage points, increasing by 0.25 percentage points each passing month).
Considering that the average duration of an infringement procedure is 35 months in
the prelitigation phase alone, the potential interest payments can be significant.
In 2015, the Commission addressed a letter to the Czech Republic alleging that it
failed to collect tariffs on imports of pocket lighters from Laos. Consequently, the
Commission demanded payment of approximately 2.1 million €. 
The Czech Republic disagreed with the Commission’s assessment and argued that
it was not obliged to transfer the money under Art. 17 (2) of Regulation 1150/2000.
However, it did not want to risk the additional interest payments after a potential
infringement ruling. Its only option to avoid the accumulation of interest and maintain
its objection to the Commission’s demand, was to pay the amount with reservations
as to the validity of the Commission’s claim. However, as the demanded amount
was now payed, the Commission had no interest or reason to initiate infringement
proceedings. Consequently, there was no way for the Czech Republic to have the
Commission’s claim reviewed.
Member States had previously attempted to seek review in such situations through
actions for annulment against the Commission’s demands for payment. These
actions failed because the Commission’s letters do not have legal effects under
Regulation 1150/2000. According to the Court of Justice, they only state the
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Commission’s opinion. The accumulation of interest is merely a consequence of Art.
11 of Regulation 1150/2000 itself and does not result from the notice given to the
Member States by the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the Czech Republic brought three actions with the aim to obtain
judicial review of the demand with at least one action: an action for annulment
against the Commission’s letter demanding payment (T-147/15), an action for failure
to act because the Commission did not initiate an infringement procedure (T-13/19),
and an action for unjust enrichment in analogous application of Art. 268, 340 (2)
TFEU (T-151/20).
Searching the right remedy
The General Court (GC) rejected the action for annulment with an order that
reiterated the previous decisions of the Court of Justice on the matter.
On appeal, the Czech Republic argued that the action for annulment should be
admissible under Art. 263 TFEU in conjunction with Art. 47 of the Charter since it
lacked any other judicial remedy.
In its judgment last week, the Court of Justice maintained that the Charter was
not meant to affect the admissibility criteria of the different actions in the Treaties.
The fact that effective judicial protection must be ensured, cannot confer legal
effects on a non-binding letter (paras 51-64). This reflects the position of the Court
of Justice that under Art. 47 of the Charter, it is primarily the task of the Member
States to assure effective legal protection where a remedy under EU law is not
readily available. 
Since the Czech Republic claimed not to have a remedy in the present situation,
the Court of Justice also examined the possibility of obtaining judicial protection by
different means, thereby deciding the fate of the Czech Republic’s other two actions
(paras 77-84).
The Court of Justice rejected a review through an infringement proceeding resulting
from an action for failure to act (paras 77-80). This approach was favoured
by Advocate-General Sharpston. She argued that the Commission should be obliged
to initiate infringement proceedings when a Member State pays a demand of own
resources with reservations. Since such repayment could be demanded by the
Member State at any time, it does not constitute the realisation of the Member
State’s duties under Regulation 1150/2000 if there was indeed a justified claim of
own resources for the Union. Effective judicial review would be enabled by allowing
a narrow exception to the complete discretion of the Commission to engage a
procedure under Art. 258 TFEU.
It was unlikely for this proposal to succeed: the Court of Justice has consistently
held that it is the Commission’s complete discretion whether it initiates infringement
procedures or not (e.g. here, here and here). Such an obligation was the favoured
solution of the Member States participating in the appeal, presumably because the
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Commission carries the burden of proof in infringement proceedings. Inevitably
though, one exception to the Commission’s discretion leads to demands for the next
and while the Court agreed that a payment with reservations can be grounds for
infringement proceedings if the reservations are unjustified (paras 73-76), it did not
want to oblige the Commission to initiate a procedure under Art. 258 TFEU.
Finding the right remedy
Especially since there was an alternative to the revolutionary approach of
Advocate-General Sharpston: an action for unjust enrichment. Both Advocate-
Generals Kokott and Sharpston have considered this a(nother) possible solution.
While the Treaties do not provide explicitly for such a remedy, in Masdar (C-47/07
P) the Court of Justice had previously ruled it admissible in analogous application of
Art. 268, 340 (2) TFEU.
The reimbursement of undue enrichments is common to the laws of all Member
States. While it does not constitute non-contractual liability of the Union in the
strict sense, it would be contrary to Art. 47 of the Charter if judicial protection were
denied solely because the Treaties do not make express mention of an action for
recovery of unjust enrichment. Thus, where the Union was enriched by another’s
impoverishment without legal justification, an action can be brought to recover the
lost funds.
In the context of disputes between the Union and the Member States, there is
one major argument against such an action: the GC would potentially rule on the
infringement of the Treaties by a Member State, which is not its task but that of
the Court of Justice. Still, the GC decides on the compatibility of state aid with the
internal market and thus on an infringement of the Treaties by Member States
already. Thus, the evolution brought about by an action for unjust enrichment is
a minor one. The Court of Justice was undeterred by that counterargument in the
present case.
One gap less in the EU’s system of judicial remedies
Member States now know how to challenge the Commission’s demands for own
resources while mitigating adverse financial consequences: paying with reservations
and initiating an action for damage based on unjust enrichment. They will then have
to prove that there is no justification for the enrichment, e.g. because Art. 17 (2) of
Regulation 1150/2000 lifted the obligation to collect the respective own resources. 
While Regulation 1150/2000 is no longer in effect, its modus operandi was retained
in Regulation 609/2014, so that judicial review will function in the same way in the
current multiannual financial framework and presumably also in the next one.
A solution to this issue of judicial protection is welcome. While it is true that the
high interest rates under Regulation 1150/2000 (and now Regulation 609/2014)
are justified to ensure timely payments and thus the orderly financing of the Union,
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there should be a way for a Member State acting in good faith to remove doubts
about the lawfulness of a demand without prohibitive additional payments. In this
regard, it is commendable that the Court did not share the Commission’s apparent
position that the Member State must bear the risk of an infringement procedure and
the accumulating interest if they want to contest the Commission’s assessment.
Still, the search for the right remedy was onerous: it took six years of litigation with
the involvement of five Member States only to establish how judicial remedy could
be obtained. However, this is not the sole responsibility of the Commission. The
Member States themselves are responsible as well. They rejected a Commission
regulation proposal giving the Commission the power to issue binding opinions
on outstanding own resources. While this would have given the Member States a
legal act to attack with an action for annulment, they chose to maintain more limited
powers for the Commission.
Despite the fact that this gap of effective judicial protection has now been closed,
similar situations are bound to arise, if an applicant seeks judicial protection
against an act supposedly without legal effect or if the applicant does not satisfy
the Plaumann criteria. The Court of Justice will then direct him towards the Member
States’ judicial system from where the case may be referred for a preliminary ruling. 
As the present case illustrates, a reinterpretation of the Treaties’ system of judicial
remedies based on Art. 47 of the Charter will only result from a situation where
judicial protection cannot be achieved on a national level (e.g. when the Member
States’ courts lack competence to adjudicate the matter): neither in Masdar nor
in this case could the applicant be redirected towards a Member States’ court.
Consequently, the Court could not refer them to the Member States’ courts – as it
usually does – and closed the gap by broadening the criteria under which an action
for damages can be brought.
To keep the promise of “a Community based on the rule of law”  where “neither its
Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter,
the   Treaty”, it is desirable that the Member States, the Commission and the Court
work together more smoothly in the future to address any lacunae in the Union’s
system of judicial remedies.
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